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POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNITED STATES
RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
Aryeh Neier*
One reason that it took so long for the United States to become a
party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Covenant)1 is that ratification never became an important issue on
the agenda of the many organizations devoted to the protection of
civil rights and civil liberties within the United States. As national
executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
at the time that President Jimmy Carter signed the Covenant, this
writer can attest that the largest such organization in the United
States provided at best perfunctory support for approval by the Sen-
ate. Moreover, most of the ACLU's officers and staff, let alone its
membership of nearly 300,000, were oblivious to the fact that such
a treaty existed. Other groups formed to promote rights within the
United States, such as those devoted to the advancement of women
or particular minorities, evinced no greater concern with the
Covenant.
This lack of interest in the Covenant reflected the view that the
protection of liberty within the United States would not be notice-
ably affected by international agreements, regardless of whether the
United States became a party to them. The ACLU, and other orga-
nizations concerned with civil rights and liberties, then and now,
considered that the liberties of Americans have depended largely on
the Constitution of the United States and its interpretation and en-
forcement by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of gov-
ernment. So far as the ACLU has been concerned, it is the First
Amendment that above all has epitomized the significance of the
* Mr. Neier is President of the Open Society Fund. He previously served as Executive Director
of Human Rights Watch, and before that as Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties
Union.
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, adopted by the United States Sept. 8, 1992)
[hereinafter ICCPR].
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Constitution as the escutcheon of liberty, not only because of the
intrinsic significance of its protections for freedom of speech, press,
assembly, and religion, but also because of the instrumental signifi-
cance of the right to protest in assuring that other important rights,
such as equal protection of the laws, will actually be enforced. Dis-
dain for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by
many of those Americans familiar with its terms focused particu-
larly on the abridgments of the freedoms of speech, press, and as-
sembly permitted by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 22.2
In the Carter years, when ratification of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights might have been possible if the
groups concerned with civil rights and liberties within the United
States had weighed in significantly, the movement concerned with
human rights internationally was relatively puny. It lacked the ca-
pacity to mobilize the necessary support for ratification. Accord-
ingly, despite the support of the president and the Department of
State, ratification was not possible at that time.
In the intervening years, concern with human rights internation-
ally has grown greatly within the United States. Accordingly, it is
now de rigueur for public officials - presidents, Secretaries of
State, members of Congress, and others - to profess their dedica-
tion to the cause. International human rights issues, involving such
countries as China, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Haiti, occasionally be-
came a factor in the 1992 presidential election campaign. The
growth of concern is also reflected in press coverage, courses in col-
leges and schools of law, and the proliferation and expansion of non-
governmental organizations devoted to the promotion of human
rights internationally. When I made the transition at the end of the
1970s from a career that focused on the promotion of civil liberties
domestically to one concerned with protecting human rights interna-
tionally, it was the occasion for rather quizzical responses from
many of my acquaintances. They were perplexed at what was per-
ceived as a shift to a cause of marginal significance. Such a reaction
would not be possible today. The international human rights cause
has achieved a legitimacy comparable to that of the movement for
the promotion of rights and liberties domestically. The decision by
the Bush Administration to seek ratification of the Covenant re-
flected that legitimacy. Failure to ratify increasingly had come to be
2. ICCPR, supra note 1, arts. 19-22, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178.
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an oddity; more than that, it was an international embarrassment.
The political genesis of the movement to ratify the Covenant is
important to understand in evaluating its significance. It would be
misleading to suggest that ratification is attributable in the slightest
degree to the efforts of those who thereby sought to achieve in-
creased protection for rights and liberties within the United States.
That is not to say that ratification is without value in this respect.
My own view is that, despite the Bush Administration's reserva-
tions, declarations, and understandings, the Covenant will, over
time, prove valuable in civil liberties litigation in the United States
and, conceivably, will also be helpful in shaping the decisionmaking
of the executive and legislative branches of government. The reason
to be clear about the provenance of the effort to ratify is to assist in
assessing whether the form in which the Covenant was approved so
undermines the purposes of ratification as to render what took place
either meaningless or harmful. In my judgment, though I object to
most of the reservations, declarations, and understandings - but
certainly not to those that reject the limitations in the Covenant on
what would be First Amendment rights in the domestic context -
so harsh a judgment is not warranted. On balance, ratification, even
in this circumscribed form, is an important step in the right
direction.
In essence, ratification in this form is a valuable symbolic gesture.
It is explicit acknowledgment that it is inappropriate for the United
States to abstain from the international system of the protection of
rights. Though the United States was obnoxiously smug about its
own system of protecting rights and liberties domestically in the
manner that it became a party to the Covenant, this does not gain-
say the value of the explicit recognition that this country should be
accountable to the international community for the way that the
government deals with its own nationals. Previously, the United
States had thumbed its nose at the international community on this
score. No more. Now the United States has said that it accepts the
competence of the U.N. Human Rights Committee to receive and
consider communications under Article 41 of the Covenant in which
one government that is a party to the Covenant may complain that
another such government is not fulfilling its obligations. Despite the
reservations entered by the United States, the great majority of the
guarantees of rights in the Covenant are not so encumbered. Ac-
cordingly, the United States has undertaken an international obliga-
1993] 1235
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
tion to comply with virtually all the significant provisions of the
Covenant (again, excepting those that purport to limit First Amend-
ment rights) and would be obliged to set forth its responses to com-
plaints. In this manner, the United States would subject itself, with
its own formal consent, to international scrutiny of its performance
with respect to the provisions of the Covenant.
Critics of the manner in which the Covenant was ratified have
focused not only on the reservations with respect to particular provi-
sions but also on the declaration by the United States that the provi-
sions of Articles 1 through 27 are not self-executing. Though this
declaration is deplorable, it must be viewed in the light of the prac-
tice in the great majority of countries that are parties to the Cove-
nant. It has been unnecessary for them to make such declarations
because there is no opportunity for their nationals to obtain domes-
tic judicial enforcement of the provisions of the Covenant. Yet advo-
cates of human rights internationally rightly attach great signifi-
cance to the widespread ratification of the Covenant because it
legitimizes monitoring of compliance with its requirements by the
United Nations, other governments, and nongovernmental organiza-
tions, and denunciation of governments for their failure to live up to
their international commitments. Worldwide, international monitor-
ing is the foremost means of protecting human rights. It is now also
legitimate in the cage of the United States and has been so recog-
nized by our government.
In becoming a party to the Covenant, of course, the United States
has done more than signify that it too is accountable to the interna-
tional community for its domestic practices. It has also enhanced
the legitimacy of international monitoring and accountability gener-
ally. As the most powerful country on earth, as the government that
has the most solidly entrenched legal protections for rights and, de-
spite its inconsistencies, as the government that has played the lead-
ing role on the world scene in calling on other governments to re-
spect rights, the previous failure of the United States to ratify had a
particularly unfortunate effect. It suggested that the United States
held the view that respect for rights was a question of geopolitical
alignment rather than a universal obligation. By becoming a party
to the Covenant, the United States has made a significant shift in its
3. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1992), reprinted




My belief that ratification of the Covenant will ultimately prove
useful in the protection of civil liberties and civil rights in the
United States reflects the fact that, in many important provisions
that were not the subject of reservations, there are protections in the
Covenant that go beyond those set forth explicitly in the U.S. Con-
stitution. To the extent that these protections are available to Amer-
icans, it is as a consequence of judicial decisions interpreting the
U.S. Constitution or as a result of state constitutional or federal and
state statutory provisions. That the United States has declared that
the Covenant is non-self-executing will not prevent the courts or the
other branches of government from shaping their decisions to con-
form to international standards to which the United States has now
proclaimed its adherence. Over time, ratification of the Covenant
will almost certainly help to mitigate the isolation of the United
States from the international system for the protection of rights. Ac-
cordingly, it can be predicted that the provisions of the Covenant
will, slowly but surely, become more influential in the decisions of
the courts and the other branches of our government.
The following are some examples of such rights that were not
made subject to reservations:
(1) The Covenant prohibits sex discrimination." Except with re-
spect to voting, the U.S. Constitution has no explicit prohibition.
(2) The Covenant protects ethnic and linguistic minorities, includ-
ing the right of the latter to use their own language.' The U.S. Con-
stitution is silent.
(3) The Covenant protects the right of privacy in the family,
home, or correspondence.6 The U.S. Constitution is silent except
with respect to the home.
(4) The Covenant protects liberty of movement.7 The U.S. Con-
stitution has no explicit protection.
(5) The Covenant prohibits medical or scientific experimentation
without consent by the subject." The U.S. Constitution is silent.(6) The Covenant requires that the victim of an unlawful arrest
or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.9 The
4. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
5. Id. art. 27, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
6. Id. art. 17, 999 U.N.T.S. at 177.
7. Id. art. 12, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176.
8. Id. art. 7, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
9. Id. art. 9, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175-76.
19931 1237
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Administration has entered an understanding that would limit this
to what may be available under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.10 Yet the U.S. Constitution
is silent even as to this much, and it seems to me entirely possible
that Bivens could be further eroded.
(7) The Covenant requires that a defendant must be informed in
a language which he understands and have free assistance of an in-
terpreter in court.1 The U.S. Constitution is silent.
(8) The Covenant requires equality of the rights of spouses.1 2 The
U.S. Constitution is silent.
(9) The Covenant requires that parents may educate their chil-
dren in accordance with their own religious and moral convictions.' 3
The U.S. Constitution is silent.
(10) The Covenant requires that, save in exceptional circum-
stances, the accused shall not be mingled with convicts.' The
United States has entered a reservation that such mingling would be
permissible on the basis of dangerousness or when the accused waive
their right to segregation.' 5 Yet the mingling of the accused and
convicts in the United States in practice generally takes place be-
cause of administrative convenience or overcrowding. No reservation
exempts this practice from the requirements of the Covenant. The
U.S. Constitution is silent.
(11) The Covenant requires the availability of commutation of a
death sentence. 6 The U.S. Constitution is silent except with regard
to federal offenses.
This list could be expanded. Some of the rights explicitly guaran-
teed in the Covenant but protected in the United States now only by
judicial decision are probably secure, quite aside from the ratifica-
tion of the Covenant. For example, it seems unlikely that the courts
will turn their backs on the line of judicial decisions of the past two
decades that prohibit sex discrimination. Other rights that Ameri-
10. 403 U.S. 388, 388 (1971) (holding that a violation of the petitioner's Fourth Amendment
rights by a federal agent acting "under color of his authority" may give rise to a cause of action
for damages). For the precise wording of the understanding, see SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS. supra note 3, at 16, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 656.
11. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 14, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176-77.
12. Id. art. 23, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
13. Id. art. 18, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178.
14. Id. art. 10, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176.
15. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 3, at 16-17, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at
656.
16. ICCPR, supra note I, art. 6, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174-75.
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cans enjoy as a result of judicial interpretation of vaguely worded
constitutional provisions are less secure. Ratification could weigh in
the balance in future consideration by the courts.
Of course, the Covenant would be a stronger source of protection
for the rights of Americans if the Congress were persuaded to adopt
implementing legislation.1" That is a goal to be pursued. Pending
the enactment of such legislation, ratification of the Covenant even
in its encumbered form is a significant accomplishment.
Just how significant this accomplishment turns out to be is, in
some measure, dependent on the manner in which nongovernmental
organizations concerned with rights deal with ratification. If groups
litigating rights issues in the United States regularly invoke the
Covenant, it will become more familiar to judges and, thereby, its
influence will be heightened. Similarly, if nongovernmental groups
concerned with rights internationally promote assessment of the
United States in the light of the international commitments it has
now undertaken, the symbolic significance of adherence will be
enhanced.
When ratification took place, it was not noticed, or barely noticed,
by the general press. That is unfortunate. The movements in the
United States concerned with rights domestically and internation-
ally should have celebrated, thereby drawing attention to an historic
event. That opportunity was missed; it is largely up to the nongov-
ernmental rights group to see to it that they do not lose the chance
to obtain tangible advances in the years ahead from the decision by
the United States, at long last, to join the international system for
the protection of rights.
17. See Michael H. Posner & Peter J. Spiro, Adding Teeth to United States' Ratification of
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The International Human Rights Conformity Act of
1993, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1209 (1993).
19931 1239

